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Proofs only ever produce a merely indirect insight. 
F. W. J. Schelling 
 
The core of the papers gathered here were first presented at a conference on the 
philosophy of religion hosted by the International Institute for Hermeneutics at 
Mount Allison University (New Brunswick) in August 2006. Other papers were 
solicited by the editors to round out a historical retrieval of the proofs for God’s 
existence. The editors would like to thank all who contributed papers to the 
volume, as well as everyone involved in the Mount Allison meeting, the 
presenters, many of whom joined us from Europe, Mount Allison philosophy 
students who assisted in the organization of the conference, and the president of 
Mount Allison University, Dr. Robert Campbell, who helped bring the whole 
event to actuality by a crucial infusion of funds at the last minute. Last but not 
least, I would like to thank Michael Austin for his invaluable editorial assistance. 
 The proofs for God invariably disappoint the questions which give rise to 
them. These questions belong to three different forms of the absolute question, 
corresponding to three religious attitudes: faith, agnosticism, and gnosis. The 
question of the absolute (objective genitive) is directed to the absolute, it is the 
absolute’s question. As such the question may dare to address God as a divine 
person. Thus conceived the absolute question is a work of faith. Here is the nub 
of the tradition, faith seeking understanding as Anselm, improvising on 
Augustine put it. The question may also be a question about the absolute, the 
question that raises the problem of the questionability of the absolute. As such 
the question is the expression of agnosticism. The absolute question can be 
thought of, finally, as the question of the absolute (subjective genitive), the 
question which originates in the absolute, which has something of the absolute 
about it, a question which is itself an indication or expression of the absolute. 
Here we may ask about the possibility of a kind of pre-knowledge of the 
absolute, a variety of gnosis, informing and driving the intellect in a certain 
direction: grasping in an inexpressible experience something of the reality of the 
absolute, and inflamed by a longing for the fullness of absolute knowledge and 
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presence, the questioner seeks to elaborate the conditions of the possibility of the 
absolute.   
 In recent philosophy most philosophical questioning of the absolute 
occurs within the attitude of agnosticism. Agnosticism is not necessarily a 
renunciation of the infinity of intellectual eros expressed in faith and gnosis. 
Philosophical agnosticism might in fact inspire and motivate philosophy to reach 
beyond a certain limited frame of questionability, to absolutize questioning itself 
by excluding no possible frame of questionability, no possible mode of cognition. 
In this instance, the question so extends itself as to gesture towards the possibility 
of that which reason cannot think. But how to avoid Hegel? How to avoid turning 
the absolute poverty of reason into absolute knowledge? We avoid Hegel by 
refusing to make questioning itself a mode of knowing. The prisoner who taps on 
the wall of his cell knows that there is an outside, but does not know anything 
else about it. He knows only that the wall is a wall, and all walls shut out at the 
same time that they shut in. The Hegelian dialectic of the limit would make all 
demarcation of a boundary into a mapping of an exterior. To know one’s poverty 
is not an implicit wealth, to trace the limit is not necessarily to be already beyond 
it.  
 One makes this point best by taking a good hard look at the proofs—the 
point of this volume. Is philosophical theology ever conclusive? What would it 
mean to take one of the proofs as conclusive, aside from the bald assertion, that 
God is? Would it not mean to take a cosmology, and an epistemology, above all, 
a metaphysics as conclusive?  
 A-gnosis is not a denial of the possibility of gnosis but a denial that 
philosophy as such possesses or could possess gnosis. One does not philosophize 
in the face of God: one worships. This does not mean that philosophy must be in 
principle atheistic (Heidegger). Exactly the opposite is true. Philosophy cannot 
claim any more certainty about this question than its methods allow. None of the 
proofs show conclusively that God exists, for each of them assumes a 
metaphysics, which is only one among the many that are possible. But none of 
the failures to prove show that God is not. Given a certain metaphysics, say act-
potency, then God must exist. For nothing that is at some time and in some 
respect in potency can reduce itself to act.  To concede this metaphysical point is 
to affirm the necessity of pure act, that which is not moved by another but which 
moves all moved movers. It is the metaphysics of act-potency that is at issue in 
this proof, not God’s existence. There are other forms of metaphysics, which 
yield other forms of proof: Spinoza’s metaphysics of efficient causality for 
example, with its attendant ontological proof. One wonders if Aquinas lists “five 
ways,” not in order to show how indubitable God’s existence is for philosophy 
(everywhere you turn, there he is), but in order to show how multiple the ways to 
him are. Even granted that the five ways in some fashion work together to 
generate the conclusion, that God exists, Aquinas has little to conclude therefrom 
about “what we all call God.” Indeed, by calling God First Cause, Pure Act, 
Necessary Being, etc, Aquinas admits that he does not know what God is. The 
world “proportionate” to the human intellect (as Lonergan puts it) is a world of 
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physically-embedded forms, the existence of which are contingent upon other 
forms, and knowledge of which begins and ends with sensible being. Pure act is 
not something that a living, embodied, and temporally-bound human being could 
possibly know in the full sense of the term. Such agnosticism says nothing about 
the possibility of a non-philosophical disclosure of God. 
 The question might be absolute (without restriction), but a proof cannot 
be. A proof is at best a way (via), perilous and vulnerable to multiple attacks, to a 
provisional certainty conditional upon conceding a particular and eminently 
questionable metaphysics. 
 
